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STATEMENT 01; THE CASE

A.

Nature of the Case

Donald Ray Yarber appeals following a jury's guilty verdicts on five felony counts of
video voyeurism and two misdemeanor charges. On appeal, he asserts that the district court
erred in denying his motion for acquittal and that the evidence presented was not sufficient to
support the jury's verdicts on the video voyeurism charges. Mr. Yarber also asserts the district
court erred in allowing prior bad act and other character evidence to be admitted at trial. Finally,
Mr. Yarber submits that the district court abused its discretion and imposed an excessive
sentence, particularly with regard to the five year consecutive sentences on three of the video
voyeurism charges, and his status as a first-time offender.
B.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings

Mr. Yarber and his partner of 14 years ("K.B. '') ended their relationship around the end
of June 2013 when K.B. moved out of the apmiment they shared. (Tr., pp. 236-37.) They spent
the "next few months ... in limbo trying to figure out if (they] wanted to get back together."
(Tr., p. 236, Ls. 18-20.) During this time, in August of 2013 1, K.B. took pictures of her "intimate
areas", including her buttocks, vaginal area, and breasts, and sent them to Mr. Yarber. (Tr., p.
242.) She testified that she took the pictures for a "sexual purpose", to "appeal to" Mr. Yarber,
because "[h]e liked them and [they] had been together for a long time". (Tr., p. 243, Ls. 14-22.)
She testified that she did not "think he necessarily asked (her] for them." (Tr., p. 244, Ls. 2-6).
K.B. did not remember exactly when she sent the pictures to Mr. Yarber, but testified that he
had already moved from Boise to New York when she sent them and that he had moved to New
York at the beginning of August. (Tr., p. 243, Ls. 7-10.)
1
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After K.B. cut off contact with Mr. Yarber, he felt "horrible", "did not know "how to
handle it", wanted to "get her attention", and tried to "get back at her for not responding to
[him]". (Tr., p. 462, L. 9

p. 463, L. 8). Unfortunately, between September 11 and 19, 2013,

Mr. Yarber sought to get her attention and response by calling her hundreds of times, and then
posting the intimate pictures K.B. sent to him in August in Craigslist ads in the "Casual
Encounters" section of that website, without her permission. (Tr., pp. 245-53; 327-28). Several
individuals responded to these ads, some including intimate pictures of themselves, and others
suggesting sexual encounters or seeking to meet up in person with K.B. (Tr., pp. 346-50.)
On February 4, 2014, the Grand Jury considered eight charges against Mr. Yarber
stemming from this conduct. (Tr. 2/4/14, p. 3 ). That same day, the State of Idaho ("the State")
filed an Indictment, charging Mr. Yarber with six felony counts of video voyeurism (Idaho Code
§ 18-6609), a misdemeanor charge of using a telephone to annoy, harass and/or offend (Idaho
Code § 18-6710), and a misdemeanor charge of disturbing the peace (Idaho Code § 18-6409). (R.,
pp. 36-40.) The focus of Mr. Yarber's appeal is the video voyeurism charges.
The district court denied trial counsel's Motion to Dismiss the Indictment (R., p. 52; Tr.,
pp. 21-22), and the case proceeded to trial on May 12-15, 2014. During trial, the district court
denied Mr. Yarber' s oral Idaho Criminal Rule 29 motion for acquittal. The district court also
allowed evidence of (I) Mr. Yarber' s responses to ads placed in the Craigslist "Casual
Encounters" section accomplished around the same time he posted the ads with the pictures of
K.B., and (2) Craigslist posting with K.B.'s pictures made in January, 2014, several months after
the conduct in September of 2013 on which the charges are based. The jury ultimately returned
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guilty verdicts on both of the misdemeanor charges and on five of the six video voyeurism
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counts, reporting they were unable to reach a unanimous verdict on Count Six. (Tr., pp. 535-38.)
The district court sentenced Mr. Yarber to the maximum penalty of five years in prison,
with all five years fixed, on Count One; a consecutive five year tem1, with two years fixed, on
Count Two, another consecutive five year term consisting of five years indeterminate, on Count
Three, concurrent five year indeterminate terms on Counts Four and Five, and concurrent terms
of one year on Count Seven, and six months on Count Eight. (R., pp. 143-45.) Mr. Yarber filed
timely motion under Idaho Criminal Rule 35, seeking a reduction of his sentences (R., p.169),
which the district court denied without a hearing. (R., pp. 170-74). He timely appeals from the
Judgment of Conviction and Commitment entered on July 2, 2014. (R., pp. 142-46; 153-55.)2

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
I.

Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Yarber's oral Idaho Criminal Rule 29

motion for judgment of acquittal because the evidence presented to the jury was insufficient to
convict him of the video voyeurism charges?

'

'

I
I

I

I

Mr. Yarber has not appealed from the district court's denial of his Rule 35 motion because
"[ w ]hen presenting a Rule 35 motion, the defendant must show that the sentence is excessive in
light of new or additional information subsequently provided to the district court in support of
the Rule 35 motion." State v. Huffman, 159 P.3d 838,840, 144 Idaho 201,203 (2007). Here, as
the district court found, Mr. Yarber's trial counsel filed "nothing in support of his motion", and
thereby submitted no new or additional information for the court to consider. (R.. , pp. 171-72.)
And, "[aJn appeal from the denial of a Rule 35 motion cannot be used as a vehicle to review the
underlying sentence absent the presentation of new information. Huffman, 159 P.Jd at 840,144
Idaho at 203.
2
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rI.

Did the district court err in allowing evidence of(!) Mr. Yarber's Craigslist use

unrelated to his posting of the ads with K.B.' s pictures and (2) his posting of another Craigslist
ad with K.B.' s pictures months aner the conduct the time when the charged conduct occurred?
III.

Did the district court abuse its discretion and impose an excessive sentence when

it imposed a sentence that included three consecutive five year sentences --- one with five years
fixed, another with two years fixed, three years indeterminate, and a third with five years
indeterminate--- upon Mr. Yarber' s convictions for video voyeurism?
ARGUMENT

I.

There is Insufficient Evidence to Support the Video Voyeurism Charges

A.

Intrnduction

The trial couti denied trial counsel's oral motion for judgment of acquittal made pursuant
to Idaho Rule of Criminal Procedure 29 (Tr., p. 419; p. 425, Ls. 11 15). This motion was based
on trial counsel's argument that the State had not demonstrated the intent necessary to support
convictions on the video voyeurism charges. The district court ruled that the State had provided
sufficient evidence, including K.B.'s testimony and the tape recording of Mr. Yarber's police
interview, to show that he disseminated the pictures. (Tr., p. 423, L. 23

p. 424, L. 10.) The

court also found that, even if Mr. Yarber had "dual purposes" in posting the images, one reason
he put the pictures on Craigslist is because men "get horny" looking at these kinds of pictures.
(Tr., p. 424, Ls. 16-22). Additionally, the court found relevant that the individuals responding to
the ads "were sexually aroused". (Tr., p. 424, L. 23

p. 425, L. 7.) Mr. Yarber appeals from the
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trial court's denial of his Rule 29 motion and argues there was insufficient evidence to convict
him on the video voyeurism charges.
B.

Standards of Review

Following the State's presentation of its case, Mr. Yarber's counsel moved for a
judgment of acquittal on sufficiency of the evidence grounds. The test applied when reviewing
the district court's ruling on a motion for judgment of acquittal is to determine whether the
evidence was sufficient to sustain a conviction of the crime charged. State v. Fields, 127 Idaho
904, 912-13, 908 P.2d 1211, 1219---20 (1995). When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence
where a j udgmcnt of conviction has been entered upon a jury verdict, the evidence is sufficient to
support the jury's guilty verdict if there is substantial evidence upon which a reasonable trier of
fact could have found that the prosecution sustained its burden of proving the essential elements
of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Herrera-Brito, 131 Idaho 383, 385, 957 P.2d
1099, 1101 (Ct.App. 1998); State v. Knutson, 121 Idaho 101,104,822 P.2d 998, 1001 (Ct.App.
1991 ). "[A] verdict cannot rest on speculation or conjecture." Ryan v. Beisner, 123 Idaho 42, 46
(Ct. App. 1992) (citing Petersen v. Parry, 92 lclaho 647, 652 (1968)).
The Court does not substitute its view for that of the jury as to the credibility of the
witnesses, the weight to be given to the testimony, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn
from the evidence. Knutson, 121 Idaho at 104,822 P.2d at 1001; State v. Decker, 108 Idaho 683,
684, 70 I P.2d 303, 304 (Ct.App. 1985). And, the Court considers the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution. Herrera--Brito, 13 l Idaho at 385, 957 P.2d at 1101; Knutson, 121
Idaho at 104, 822 P.2d at 100 I. However, whether a trial court properly applied a statutory
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provision to the facts of a particular case is a question of law over which the Court exercises free
review. /)'tale v. Horn, 124 Idaho 849, 850, 865 P.2d 176, 177 (Ct.App. 1993).
C.

Argument
In support of Mr. Yarber' s Ruic 29 motion, trial counsel argued that the jury could not

I
I

find "beyond a reasonable doubt that at the time the images were created they were created for
the purpose of posting them on Craigslist by the defendant later." (Tr., p. 419, Ls. 13-18.) Trial

I
I
I

counsel explained that the statute requires the images to have been created for the same purpose
for which they were ultimately used. (Tr., p. 419, Ls. 20-24.) The plain language of the statute 3
supports trial counsel's argument. The version of Idaho Code Section 18-6609(2 )(b) in effect at
the time of Mr. Yarber's trial provided:

I
I

(2) A person is guilty of video voyeurism when, with the intent of
arousing, appealing to or gratifying the lust or passions or sexual
desires of such person or another person, or for his own or another
person's lascivious entertainment or satisfaction of prurient
interest, or for the purpose of sexually degrading or abusing any
other person:

I
I
I

I
I
I
I
I
I
I

(b) He intentionally disseminates, publishes or sells any image or
images of the intimate areas of another person or persons without
the consent of such other person or persons and with knowledge
that such image or images were obtained with the intent set forth
above.

The interpretation of a statute is question of law, over which appellate courts exercise free
review. State v. Hart, 135 Idaho 827, 829 (2001 ). Statutory interpretation begins with the literal
words of the statute and those words are "given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning", and
the statute must be construed as a whole." Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg'! Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho
889,893 (2011). "If the statute is not ambiguous, this Court does not construe it, but simply
follows the law as written." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
3
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Id. (2004) (emphasis added). Accordingly, there are two specific intent clements in the statute.
First, the image must be intentionally disseminated, with knowledge that the image was obtained
with the ''intent of arousing, appealing to or gratifying the lust or passions or sexual desires of
such person or another person, or for his own or another person's lascivious entertainment or
satisfaction of prurient interest" (hereinafter "appealing to the sexual desires of his own or
another person"). As trial counsel pointed out in support of his Rule 29 motion, Mr. Yarber "had
nothing to do with creating" the images and the purpose they were later put to "had nothing to do
with their creation." (Tr., p. 420, Ls. 1-5.)
One way to look at the issue is to consider whether a video voyeurism charge under the
2004 version of thc: statute can be supported when the pictures were taken by one individual with
one specific intent, but the later publication or posting of those pictures was accomplished by a
different individual with a different intent. The statute appears to require that the pictures be
obtained and disseminated with the same intent. Regardless, K.B. took the pictures of herself, on
her own. At trial, K.B. testified that she "knew" that Yarber liked the pictures, but said "I don't
think he necessarily asked me for them." (Tr., p. 244, Ls. 4-6.) Mr. Yarber was not present
when she took the pictures. (Tr., p. 305, Ls. 5-8). Additionally, this was not the only time she
had ever taken these types of pictures. (Tr., p. 243, Ls. 11-13.) Accordingly, although she may

I
I
I

I

I

have created the images with the intent of "of arousing, appealing to or gratify the lust or
passions or sexual desires" of herself or another person, this does not establish Mr. Yarber' s
intent when he received the pictures K.B. willingly sent to him. Nor does that intent necessarily
match up with the intent with which they were disseminated by Mr. Yarber.
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The Court of Appeals, in a case charging video voyeurism with a different type of intent
than that charged here, addressed the intent clement of the 2004 version of the statute. S'tate v.
McLellan, 154 Idaho 77, 78, 294 P.3d 203, 204 (Ct. App. 2013).

The appellate court in

McLellan agreed that the trial court properly found probable cause was lacking for a video

voyeurism charge, upholding the district court's determination that "the state failed to present
any evidence on the intent of [the defendant] when he obtained the video-a material clement of
the crime." State v. McLellan, 154 Idaho 77, 78, 294 P.3d 203, 204 (Ct. App. 2013). Here, the
evidence points to K.B.'s intent in sending the photos to Mr. Yarber, and she testified she took
the pictures for a "sexual purpose", to "appeal to" Mr. Yarber, because "[h]e liked them and
[they] had been together for a long time". (Tr., p. 243, Ls. 14-22.) However, her intent to take
the pictures for a sexual purpose docs not demonstrate Mr. Yarber's intent.

K.B. took the

pictures and sent them to Mr. Yarber. That she might have met the statute's intent element by
creating the pictures in an attempt to appeal to Mr. Yarber's sexual desires does not necessarily
establish that Mr. Yarber had the intent required by the statute.
Even if there is sufficient evidence of Mr. Yarber's intent in "obtaining" the images, and
the Court determines that the intent for both disseminating and obtaining the images need not be
identical, the weight of the evidence in the record indicates that Mr. Yarber posted the images on
Craigslist to get K. B. 's attention and as revenge for her ending their relationship and not talking
to him. Although he may have been aware that these types of images make men "horny", his
testimony indicates that he did not disseminate the pictures for that purpose, but rather to get
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It

I
I

back at K.B. and get her attention. Not a laudable reason, but at the time he was charged, this
type of intent was not sufficient to support a video voyeurism charge.
Indeed, around the time Mr. Yarber was sentenced in July 2014, the Idaho legislature
amended the video voyeurism statute for the following purpose:

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

The law is in place to protect privacy of individuals. Currently, the
law is narrowly tailored to combat the sharing of images that are
used for sexual gratification when there is not consent to do so.
The law does not address the use of pictures or videos of an
intimate or private nature that are shared without consent for other
purposes that are just as damaging as sexual gratification, such as
revenge, extortion or humiliation. This proposed legislation would
provide protections in those instances.
Second Regular Session of the Sixty-Second Idaho Legislature, House Bill 563, Statement of
Purpose, RS22978 (2014 ), available at http://legislature.idaho.gov/legislation/20 l 4/H0563 .htm
(site last visited Mar. 4, 2015).

The 2014 version of the statute also modified the intent

requirement, allowing for "reckless disregard" and ·'reasonably should have known'' to satisfy
the intent requirements, as noted in the redlined version copied below:
(2) A person is guilty of video voyeurism when, :
(a) Ww-ith the intent of arousing, appealing to or gratifying the lust or passions or sexual
desires of such person
or another person, or for his own or another person's lascivious entertainment or satisfaction
of prurient interest, or for the purpose of sexually degrading or abusing any other person~
&>-, he uses, installs or permits the use or installation of an imaging device at a place where
a person would have a reasonable expectation of privacy, without the knowledge or consent
of the person using such place; or
(b) He either intentionally or with reckless disregard disseminates, publishes or sells
or conspires to disseminate, publish or sell any image or images of the intimate areas of
another person or persons without the consent of such other person or persons and with
knovlledge he knows or reasonably should have known that such image or images ,vere
obtained with the intent set forth above one (1) or both parties agreed or
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under-stood that the images should remain private.

Ben Ysursa, General Laws of the State of fdaho Passed by the Second Regular Session of the
Sixty-Second

Idaho

Legislature,

Vo I.

1,

pp.

4 77-78

(2014 ),

available

at

http://lcgislature.idaho.gov/sessioninfo/2014/sessionlaws.htm ( site last visited Mar. 4, 2015).
This provides further support for applying the statute the way Mr. Yarber' s trial counsel
proposed in his Rule 29 motion argument as the legislature sought to modify the statute after the

Mclellan decision and removed the "obtained with the intent language" of the 2004 version of
the statute. See supra, 154 Idaho 77, 294 P.3d 203.
In short, the evidence was insufficient to establish that Mr. Yarber possessed the intent
necessary to convict him of video voyeurism under the 2004 version of the statute.

The Trial Court Erred in Allowing Evidence of Mr. Yarher's General Craigslist Use
and His Posting of Another Ad With K.B.'s Pictures in January of 2014.
II.

I
I
I
I
I

A.

Introduction
The State filed two notices of intent to use Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b) to introduce

evidence to establish Defendant's intent, knowledge, or absence of mistake or accident in the
State's case in chief. The notices related to:
1.

a January 4, 2014 posting on Craigslist that includes the pictures ofK.B.;

2.

"evidence of a general nature" that Mr. Yarber used Craigslist to attempt to meet

women, and that he responded to two Craigslist advertisements with pictures of his penis.
(R., pp. 62-63; 76-80.) The State argued in the alternative that this evidence is not Rule 404(b)
evidence because it was intrinsic to the charged offense. 5'ee R., p. 78 {relying on State v. Pullin,
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152 Idaho 82, 86-87, 266 P.3d 1187, 1191-92 (Ct. App. 2011)). Additionally, the State argues
the evidence should be admitted under the doctrine of res gestae because it amounts to "other
acts that occur during the commission of or in close temporal proximity to the charged offense

I
I
I
I
I
I

which must be described to complete the story of the crime on trial by placing it in the context of
nearby and nearly contemporaneous happenings." R., p. 79 (quoting State v. Blackstead, 126
Idaho 14, 18 (Idaho Ct. App. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Mr. Yarber's trial counsel objected to admission of this evidence. See Tr., pp. 52-71.
The district court concluded that the evidence of Mr. Yarber's Craigslist searches "to hook up
with somebody sexually" around the same time he is posting the ads with K.B.' s pictures is part
of the "res gestae" and that they are relevant to demonstrate his knowledge that Craigslist can be
used for sexual purposes and his intent. (Tr., p. 66, L. 23

p. 68, L. 25). The district court also

determined that the January 4, 2014 Craigslist ad using K.B.'s pictures is evidence that Mr.
Yarber was posting the pictures for a sexual purpose himself and that because he did not send the
responses to K.B., it does not appear that he was posting the ads for revenge for her ending their

I

a

I
I
I
I
I
I

relationship. (Tr., p. 69.) The district court also found under Idaho Rule of Evidence 403 that
the probative value of this information was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice. (Tr., pp.69-70.) The testimony was admitted at trial. 4

On direct examination at trial, City of Boise Detective Charles LeBar testified that around the
same time Mr. Yarber was posting the Craigslist advertisements with K.B.' s pictures he also was
using Craigslist "to find someone ... to have sex with." (Tr., p. 321, Ls. 5-15). Detective LeBar
went on to confirm that, based on his review of Mr. Yarber's email records, Mr. Yarber was
"proficient in the use of Craigslist for sexual purposes." (Tr., p. 324, Ls. 33-6.) Testimony also
was introduced about the January 4, 2014 Craigslist posting. (Tr., pp. 395-96.)

4
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B.

Standards of Review
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove a defendant's

criminal propensity. Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b ); State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664, 667, 227
P.3d 918,921 (2010); State v. Parmer, 147 Idaho 210,214,207 P.3d 186, 190 (Ct.App. 2009).
However, such evidence may be admissible for a purpose other than that prohibited by Idaho
Rules of Evidence 404(b). 5 Panner, 147 Idaho at 214, 207 P.3d at 190. To detennine the
admissibility of evidence of prior bad acts, a two-level analysis is applied: (1) the evidence must
be relevant; and (2) the probative value must substantially outweigh any unfair prejudice to the
defendant. State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 52, 205 P.3d 1185, 1188 (2009). Relevancy requires
that the prior bad act evidence is relevant to a material, disputed issue concerning the crime
charged, other than criminal propensity. Id. Whether evidence is relevant is an issue of law.

I
I
I
I

Johnson, 148 Idaho at 667,227 P.3d at 921; Parmer, 147 Idaho at 214,207 P.3d at 190. When
considering admission of evidence of prior bad acts, the Court exercises free review of the trial
court's relevancy detennination. Parmer, 147 Idaho at 214, 207 P.3d at 190. The trial court's
balancing of the probative value of the evidence against the danger of unfair prejudice will not be
disturbed unless the court abused its discretion. State v. Norton, 151 Idaho 176, 190, 254 P .3d
77, 91 (Ct.App.2011).

"It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, provided that
the prosecution in a criminal case shall file and serve notice reasonably in advance of trial, or
during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the general nature of any
such evidence it intends to introduce at trial." Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b ).

5

I
I
I
I

Appellant's Opening Brief- 12

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

C.

Argument

First, this case is not similar to the Pullin case, in which the Idaho Court of Appeals
determined that evidence found inside of the car at the time of arrest on a particular charge "was
not evidence of a prior crime, wrong, or other act, but was merely part of the same criminal
episode." S'tate v. Pullin, 152 Idaho 82, 86-87, 266 P.3d 1187, 1191-92 (Ct. App. 2011). The
court in Pullin considered that "the search of the vehicle occurred directly after the search of
Pullin's person, and was part of the search incident to his arrest." Id. Here, the images of Mr.
Yarber' s search of and response to other women's Craigslist postings, near the same time he was
posting the ads with K.B. · s pictures, is not '·inextricably intertwined," or "part of a single
criminal episode,'" or '·a necessary preliminary to the crime charged," such that it should not be
considered Rule 404(b) evidence. S'ee State v. Sheldon, 145 Idaho 225, 226-29, 178 P.3d 28, 2832 (2008).

Indeed, Mr. Yarber' s conduct in contacting women through Craigslist is not

"criminal'' so it could not be part of a "criminal episode". Nor is a necessary preliminary to the
crime of video voyeurism or inextricably entwined with that distinct conduct. Additionally, the
January 4, 2014 advertisement was separated by almost four months from the charged conduct.
For similar reasons, the evidence should not have been admitted under the doctrine of res
gestae. While Mr. Yarber' s general Craigslist use may have been close in temporal proximity to

his posting of the ads with K.B., Mr. Yarber submits it does not "complete the story of the
crime". See State v. Blackstead, 126 Idaho 14, 18 (Idaho Ct. App. 1994).
Moreover, under the 404(b) analysis, the evidence does not sufficiently relate to his
knowledge or intent. Mr. Yarber did not dispute that he posted the ads with K.B. in September
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or that he knew how to use Craigslist or what the postings in the "Casual Encounters" section
were used for.

And, even if the circumstances surrounding the January 4 th posting made it

appear he was not posting to get revenge on K.B. for ending their relationship (because he did
not forward the responses to her), it does not make it more likely that four months earlier, in
September, when he was forwarding the ad responses to her, he was doing it for a sexual
purposes and not because he wanted her attention. All that the circumstances surrounding the
January 4, 2014 ad suggest is that, at that time, a time when his break-up was not new, he may
have been acting with a purpose other than to get K.B.'s attention. Using that to show his intent
with regard to the September postings is not closely related in time, occurred in a different
pattern than the September postings, and docs not reflect on Mr. Yarber' s state of mind during
September.

And, Mr. Yarber was not charged with a crime related to the January 4, 2014

posting.
Finally, even if the district court appropriately found the evidence is relevant, "the
probative value of the evidence in relation to intent or lack of mistake or accident must outweigh
the prejudice to the defendant." State v. McAvoy, No. 37393, 2012 WL 9490082, at *2 (Idaho
Ct. App. Mar. 1, 2012). Mr. Yarber submits that the evidence introduced here was unfairly
prejudicial. His activity in seeking out companionship, or a perhaps sexual connection, from
other women on Craigslist may have made it appear that he was doing something wrong in
simply trying to meet women on Craigslist. It had no connection to his desire to get K.B. 's
attention by posting her pictures on Craigslist.
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Ill.

The Sentences as Structured Were Excessive and Amount to an Abuse of Discretion

Mr. Yarber submits that the trial court abused its discretion and imposed excessive
sentences when it imposed three consecutive five year sentences ---one with five years fixed,
another with two years fixed, a third of five years indeterminate--- upon Mr. Yarber' s
convictions for three counts of video voyeurism when he is a first time offender, expressed
remorse, and has the support of his family.
A.

Standards of Review

This Court reviews a sentence alleged to be excessive under the abuse of discretion
standard. ,<.,'tate v. Burdett, 134 Idaho 271,276, 1 P.3d 299,304 (Ct.App. 2000). On appeal, Mr.
Yarber has the burden to show that his sentence is unreasonable upon the facts of his case and,
thus, an abuse of discretion. State v. Brown, 121 Idaho 385, 393, 825 P.2d 482, 490 (1992);
State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 90, 645 P.2d 323, 324 (1982).

A sentence of confinement is

reasonable if it appears at the time of sentencing that confinement is necessary "to accomplish
the primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of
deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution applicable to a given case." State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho
565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct.App. 1982). Where, as here, the sentence is alleged to be
excessively harsh, the Court conducts an independent review of the record, having regard for the
nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the public interest.
S'tate v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771, 772, 653 P.2d 1183, 1184 (Ct.App. 1982). The Court considers
the length of the defendant's entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387,
391 (2007).
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B.

Sentence Imposed

The State recommended a sentence of eight years fixed followed by 17 years
indeterminate. (Tr., p. 551, Ls.7-12.) Defense counsel asked the court to consider probation or
impose a unified sentence of 12 years, with three years fixed, and retain jurisdiction. (Tr., p.
567, L.24-p. 568, L.7.)
The district judge found probation "out of the question" because Mr. Yarber "allegedly
has" an "obsessive-compulsive disorder" and the court did not "know that fYarber] wouldn't
attempt to do this to [K.B.] again or to a ne,v girlfriend:' (Tr., p. 575, Ls.2-8.) The com1 also
thought ·'probation would not give him the message"' that this is a big deal and expressed concern
that Mr. Yarber might be able to figure out where K.B. is living now. (Tr., p. 575, Ls. 10-20).
The district judge also declined to retain jurisdiction, because "[p Jrobation is not on the table,"
and the judge felt there was "enough information to determine what to do." (Tr., p. 575 L.21 p.576, L.2.)
Instead, the court sentenced Mr. Yarber to a combined 15 year sentence, with seven years
fixed, as follows:

• Count One: five years fixed;
• Count Two: a unified five years, with two fixed and three indeterminate,
•
•
•
•

consecutive to Count One;
Count Three: five years indeterminate, consecutive to Counts One and Two;
Count Four: five years indeterminate, concurrently with Counts One, Two, and
Three;
Count Five: five years indeterminate, concurrently with Counts One, Two, Three,
and Four;
Count Seven: one year, concurrently with all other counts; and

,,

j,
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Count Eight: six months, concurrently with all other counts.

(Tr., p. 576, L.20 - p. 578, L.4; R., pp. 142-47) The court also imposed a $50,000 fine on Count
One and $4,405.48 in restitution. (Tr., p. 578, Ls. 5-6; R., p. 146 & pp. 167-68).
C.

Argument

The sentencing objectives are: ( 1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual
and the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution
for wrongdoing. State v. Charboneau, 861 P.2d 67, 69124 Idaho 497,499 (1993). Mr. Yarber
submits that 15 years of confinement is more than necessary to accomplish these objectives,
particularly in light of his status as a first-time offender.
The Idaho Supreme Court has ''recognized that the first offender should be accorded
more lenient treatment than the habitual criminal." S'tate v. Hoskins, 131 Idaho 670, 673 (1998)
(quoting State v. Owen, 73 Idaho 394, 402 (1953), overruled on other grounds by S'tate v.
Shepherd, 94 Idaho 227 (1971)); see also State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 91 (1982). Additionally,

Idaho's appellate courts have reduced sentences when the sentencing court has not given
sufficient consideration to a defendant's good character, status as a first time offender, sincere
expression of remorse, amenability to treatment, and family support. S'ee also State v. Payne,
146 Idaho 548, 569-70, 199 P.3d 123, 144-45 (2008) (mental health issues can be a mitigating
sentencing factor).

For instance, in State v. Shideler, the Idaho Supreme Court reduced a

sentence of imprisonment on the defendant's first felony (a bank robbery committed with a
shotgun) from an indeterminate term not to exceed twenty years to an indeterminate term not to
exceed twelve years. Id., 103 Idaho 593,595,651 P.2d 527,529 (1982). Similar to Mr. Yarber,
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the defendant in S'hideler had no prior history of any criminal activity. 6 Id. The Court also relied

I
I
I
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on the defendant having accepted responsibility for his acts, and that his family and employer
had "shown considerable interest in his future." ld. 7
l lcre, Mr. Yarber admitted that he made several fake Craigslist postings usmg the
pictures K.B. sent him and that he "took it a step further by giving her address to some of the
respondents." (PSI, p. 6.) He felt '·horrible", "embarrassed by [hisJ actions," and recognized he
"should have used [his] brain instead of [his] heart." Id. Mr. Yarber's mother confirmed that he
was "ashamed and embarrassed" of his actions and that he had always found it difficult to
express his feelings to her in the past, but it "[h]is remorse was obvious." PSI, p. 9. She also
reported that her son "has always been a good law abiding person and his actions were totally out
of character." PSI, p. 9. She noted Mr. Yarber "has no prior history of any type of discipline in
school, at work or with legal authorities," and that she believes the breakup of his long term
relationship after 14 years was "devastating to him" and amounted to "extenuating

I
The Pre sentence Investigator reports that the instant crimes were the basis for Mr. Yarber' s
"first arrest", but he had reported being cited and paying a fine for failing to stop at a stop sign in
2004 in New York. PSI, p. 7.
7
Other cases in which the appellate courts have reduced sentences rely on similar
considerations. In State v. Carrasco, the Court of Appeals reduced two concurrent indetenninate
thirty year prison tem1s imposed on two counts of delivery of cocaine to two concurrent
indeterminate terms not to exceed twenty years. Id., 114 Idaho 348, 757 P.2d 211 (Ct.App.
1988), rev'd on other grounds, 117 Idaho 295, 787 P.2d 281 (1990). The Court explained that:
(1) the defendant "had no previous criminal record; 2) the record did not reveal any drug
transactions other than those with police officers; 3) [the defendant] had presented a letter from
the chief of police in his home town and signed by fitty-one other people which attested to his
good character; and 4) !the defendant] had acknowledged the wrongfulness of his acts and
expressed contrition f<Jr them." State v. Rodriguez, 132 ldaho 261,265,971 P.2d 327,331 (Ct.
App. 1998).
5
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circumstances." Id. Mr. Yarber commented to the court at sentencing: I know my actions are
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inexcusable. I wish I could take all my actions back but I can't. I'll have to live with the horrible
decisions I have made for the rest of my life. I am thankful that [K.B.] was not physically
harmed as a result of my actions . . . . All I can do at this point is tell [K.B.] that I am sorry."
(PSI, p. 14). 8 Compare State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204,209,824 P.2d 135, 140 (Ct. App. 1991)
(determining that '·a total aggregate term of thi1iy years" on two counts of sexual abuse of a child
was "unduly harsh under the circumstances of this case", including the defendant's "expression
of remorse for his conduct, his recognition of his problem, his willingness to accept treatment
and other positive attributes of his character").
Mr. Yarber·s mother also reported that he "has full time employment waiting for him''
and that he is "honest" and "hard working". 9 (PSI, p. 9.) S'ee also PSI, p. 12 (reporting that Mr.
Yarber may have a job at Denison Kwik Fill in New York).

Additionally, Mr. Yarber

recognized that be needed counseling and therapy and he identified that he had a problem letting
Despite these statements demonstrating that Mr. Yarber understands K.B. could have been
physically harmed and wants to tell K.B. he is sorry, the Presentence Investigator opined that
"[ilt did not appear [Mr. Yarber] grasped the potential deadly outcome his black mail could have
produced." (PSI, p. 17.) Moreover, Mr. Yarber expressed understanding that his actions were
"fi]nexcusable", but the Presentence Investigator took his explanation of what he did to K.B.,
and why he might have done it (i.e., he "lost it" when she cut off contact after he went from
seeing her every day for 14 years to "nothing"), to mean that he blamed the victim for his
actions. (Compare PSI, pp. 6, 14, 17.) He testified that he felt "[h]orrible" when K.B. ended
their relationship and would not talk to him because he "lost [his] best friend". (Tr., p. 462.) Mr.
Yarber submits that his statements in the PSI demonstrate that he understood what he did was
wrong and inexcusable, but he was trying to explain his actions and the events that he thinks
might have led to his actions, and did not intend his comments to place blame on K.B.
9 To the extent Mr. Yarber had gaps in employment, it was due in part to his moving to different
states to accommodate K.B.'s career. See Tr., p. 290-91 (K.B testimony); Tr., p. 40-45
(Yarber's testimony).

8
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go of his relationship with K.B. and not being able to deal well with change. (PSI, p. 12.)
Moreover, Dr. Bill Arnold completed a Forensic Psychological Examination Report on Mr.
Yarber. (PSI, Exhibit.) In summarizing this report the Presentence Investigator noted that Mr.
Yarber "believed his parents and sister were emotionally supportive of him and wanted him to
come home" and he "expressed remorse for the crimes he committed and the pain he caused the
victim". (PSI, p. 15.)
Although counsel recognizes that the protection of society is the primary objective the
court may consider, here, the Court did not even mention Yarber's status as a first-time offender,
that he had not engaged in this type of conduct with others before, or that he had the support of
his mother and stepfather. Instead, the district court focused almost exclusively on "the harm"
caused by Mr. Yarber's actions. (Tr., p. 574, L. 20 -- p. 575, L. 1.) The sentencing court also
expressed concern that Mr. Yarber would be able to figure out where K.B. lives. (Tr., p. 575,
Ls.14-20.) However, Dr. Arnold reported that Mr. Yarber "presented as a low potential risk for
future violence." (PSI, p. 16.) Even though, as the sentencing judge pointed out, Mr. Yarber's
charges did not involve "a series of violent acts," and the judge found the assessment not "all that
relevant to the Court's consideration", Mr. Yarber submits it is relevant in this context, and in
general in relation to his risk to reoffend. (See Tr., p. 549, Ls. 8-15.)
The district court imposed a fixed five year term of imprisonment on Count One, the
maximum sentence allowed for a video voyeurism crime. Adding on the consecutive unified
five year sentence, with two years fixed, on Count Two, and the consecutive five year
indeterminate term on Count Three, Mr. Yarber will be required to serve at least seven years on
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the fixed portion of his sentences and possibly up to 15 years. Comparing his sentence to five
offenders with similar characteristics, two were sentenced to probation with the minimum
median sentence of two years and the maximum median sentence of five years, two were placed
011

retained jurisdiction, and only one was sentence to "Term with the minimum median sentence

of [one I year and the maximum median sentence of [one] year." (PSI, p. I 6.) By comparison,
Mr. Yarber's sentence is excessive, even if only the sentence of five years fixed

011

Count One is

considered. Additionally, the recidivism data provided in the PSI indicates that someone with a
low risk of re-offense who is placed on probation has only a 15.2 percent rate of re-offense while
someone sent "Directly to Tenn'' had a rate increased to 36.9 percent. (PSI, p. 16.) Thus, Mr.
Yarber's best option as a low risk offender to not re-offend is probation, which reduces the
recidivism rate following a prison term by more than half.
Mr. Yarber submits that all of his sentences should be served concurrently because they
arise out of a short term series of events involving the same victim and the same photos of her.
In S'tate v. Amerson, the Idaho Court of Appeals modified two consecutive, determinate
sentences of twenty-five years each for rape and forcible penetration offenses based on the
record and "the fact that all three charges arose from a single incident of criminal behavior."
Amerson, 129 [daho 395, 408, 925 P.2d 399, 412 (Ct. App. 1996). The Court modified the

consecutive service to two concurrent twenty-five year sentences that it found would
"sufficiently protect the public interest." Id. The Court of Appeals reached a similar result in
S'tate v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204,824 P.2d 135 (Ct. App. 1991), a case where there was not just

one single incident of behavior or just one victim. The Alberts case involved two sexual abuse
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incidents that had occurred during the same month but on different dates and involved two
different victims (the defendant"s two young nephews).

Id. at 205, 824 P.2d at 136.

The

appellate court determined that the district court's decision to require consecutive service of the
two fifteen year sentences, each with five years of minimum confinement, was an abuse of that
discretion "in light of the circumstances of the crimes and the character and background of the
defendant." Id. The Court then directed the district court to "enter a modified judgment of
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conviction specifying that the fifteen-year, unified sentences be served concurrently." Id. The
Court of Appeals has modified consecutive sentences to run concurrently in other cases. See,
e.g, State v. Hoskins, 131 Idaho 670, 672-73, 962 P.2d 1054, 1056-57 (Ct. App. 1998)

(defendant was convicted for two counts of writing bad checks and the Court upheld imposition
of maximum permissible term of three years fixed, where defendant had quickly violated
probation terms, but also concluded that ordering the maximum sentences to be served
consecutively made the sentences unduly harsh considering, among other things, the "absence of
any serious prior criminal record").
In summary, Mr. Yarber submits that the district court abused its discretion in sentencing
him based on its apparent exclusive consideration of the protection of the society and specific
deterrence, and ignoring his status as a first-time offender or any other considerations of
mitigation or rehabilitation.

He asks that his sentences on the video voyeurism counts be

reduced, particularly the maximum fixed term imposed on Count One, and that Court modify his
sentences so that all run concurrently.

I
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CONCLUSION

Mr. Yarber respectfully requests that this Court vacate all five of his convictions for
video voyeurism. Additionally, he requests that the Court reverse the district court's evidentiary
rulings. Finally, he asks the Court to reduce his sentences as it deems appropriate or remand his
cases to the district court for a new sentencing hearing.
For the above reasons, Mr. Yarber respectfully requests that this Court vacate his
conviction. Alternatively, Mr. Yarber respectfully requests that this Court vacate his conviction
and remand his case for a new trial. Alternatively, Mr. Yarber respectfully requests that this
Court reverse the district court's denial of the motion for judgment of acquittal and vacate his
wnviction. Alternatively, Mr. Yarber respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as
it deems appropriate.
DATED this£ day of March, 2015.
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